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appears to fall in an intermediate category. Thus there seems to be
a strong correlation between industry velocity and degree of coin-
cidence between receipts and expenditures.
Industry differences in velocity probably are caused in part by
factors other than those mentioned above. However, the role of such
factors appears to be minor, and their analysis will not be pursued
here.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CORPORATE AND
NON-CORPORATE SECTORS
We saw in Chart 3 that non-corporate velocity was substantially
lower than corporate velocity throughout 1939—56. One obvious
reason for this persistent difference is the heavy representation of
agriculture in the non-corporate sector. In 1955, for instance, 32.1
per cent of non-corporate cash was held by the farm subsector. Al-
though non-corporate velocity in that year was 12.6, farm velocity
was only 4.7, while velocity of unincorporated businesses was 15.8.
Corporate velocity in 1955 was 18.6; hence about half the differen-
tial between corporate and non-corporate velocities would disap-
pear if agriculture were excluded from the calculations.
On the other hand, the unincorporated and incorporated business
sectors differ in industrial composition. Trading firms, which usually
have high velocity, are much more important in the former sector.
Furthermore, unincorporated firms within any industry are probably
smaller, on the average, than corporations. One would therefore ex-
pect the velocity of unincorporated firms to exceed that of corpora-
tions. Why such is not the case is a problem that cannot be ex-
amined here.
V. WHY VELOCITY HAS RISEN SINCE THE END OF THE WAR
Earlier we considered and rejected two possible explanations of
the postwar velocity rise. In Section II we saw that the similar be-
havior of three aggregate velocity measures since 1946 argues against
hypotheses that imply differential behavior of velocities. In Section
III we saw that the postwar velocity rise cannot be explained by
weight shifts in favor of low-hoarding sectors. Insofar as weight
shifts have had any effect at all, they have been velocity-reducing.
We turn now to other explanations of postwar velocity behavior.
A strong case can be made for the view that much of the postwar
velocity rise has been simply a recovery from abnormally low war-
time values. The important question is how much of the rise has
resulted from war-related factors, how much from more fundamentalPostwar Rise in the Velocity of Money 513
and persistent forces. Clearly, the question can be answered only if
we understand the nature of velocity changes during the war.
In an earlier study based entirely on aggregate data, I concluded
that income velocity fell during the war for four major reasons:34
an understatement of prices and income in official statistics(i.e.,
velocity fell less than the charts indicate, when actual prices and
transactions are taken into account); a redistribution of money
from high- to low-velocity sectors; an increased demand for money
as people moved about the country and as the uncertainties of
demobilization drew closer; and the accumulation of liquid assets
of all types because of reduced opportunities to purchase consumer
goods during the war.
The sectoral data of Section III partially confirm this analysis.
For instance, the importance of weight shifts between 1939 and
1946 may be estimated by recomputing non-financial velocity in
1946 with 1939, rather than 1946, weights. Non-financial velocity
was 9.0 in 1939 and 6.5 in 1946; it would have been 7.4 in 1946,
had the 1939 weights been applicable in the later years. Thus more
than one-third of the decline in non-financial velocity during 1940—
46 resulted from weight shifts, consisting principally of a decline in
the corporate sector's share of total money and a rise in the shares
of the consumer, non-corporate, and federal sectors. It must be em-
phasized that these weight shifts have tended to persist since the
end of the war. Hence, insofar as velocity fell during the war be-
cause of weight shifts, the subsequent rise in velocity cannot be
regarded as "a recovery from abnormally low wartime values."
Other sector data that tend to confirm the conclusions of the
earlier study but also support the hypothesis of a postwar return
to normal velocity levels are reviewed below. However, for the cor-
porate sector a rather different interpretation is needed.
IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE VELOCITY BEHAVIOR, 1939—47
Evidence presented in Section III strongly suggests that the de-
cline in corporate velocity after 1941 was, to a great extent, a basic
change unrelated to the special circumstances of a wartime economy.
Chart 6 revealed a wide disparity in the velocity experience of large
and small firms during the war. Large-firm velocities did decline
slightly in 1942 and 1945, but the fall in aggregate corporate veloci-
ty during the war resulted largely from the severe decline among
small and medium-sized firms, particularly the former. It is clear
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that most of this decline was not caused by wartime controls: by
1948, long after the controls had been lifted, small-firm velocities
were still far below their 1939 and 1941 levels (Chart 6 and Table
9). Large-firm velocities, on the other hand, were already well above
their 1941 peaks by 1947. Apparently, velocity had fallen perma-
nently for small and medium-sized firms relative to large firms.
Actually, this convergence of corporate velocities was already
taking place before Pearl Harbor. Velocity declined inall size
classes in 1940—presumably because of increasingly easy money
TABLE 9
PER CENT RECOVERY FROM 1941—43 VELOCITY DECLINE 1948,
NON-FINANcIAL CORPORATIONS, BY ASSET-SIZE CLASSES
VELOCITIES
_____________________________
PER CENT RECOVERY FROM
1941—43 DECLINE: SIZE CLAssEs*




2 14.20 5.53 38.9
3 12.18 6.05 49.7
4.. 9.73 5.43 55.8
5.. . 6.90 5.07 73.5
6... . 4.34 4.14 95.4
7.. . 3.54 3.61 158.5
8.. 2.89 4.59 158.8
9.. 0.11 3.88 3527.3
10.. 1.47 4.94 336.1
Totai,ailclasses. 4.06 5.21 128.3
* See note to Chart 6 for identity of size classes.
and uncertainty about the business outlook—and rose in all classes
in 1941. However, while the declines of 1940 were roughly similar
percentagewise among size classes, the rises of 1941 were not. For
small firms the 1941 velocity rises were extremely modest, and the
net movement during 1940 and 1941 was downward. Large firms,
on the other hand, raised their velocity ratios substantially in 1941
and over the 2-year period as well.
As a preliminary to our analysis of these changes, let us compare
the behavior of size-class velocities with their component ratios—
spending to assets and assets to cash—during 1939—47.
Table 10 presents 1939-based indexes of size-class velocities and
their components. Velocity and the ratio of assets to cash conformed
quite closely to one another, the direction of change being the sameTABLE 10
CORPORATE SIZE-CLASS VELOCITIES AND COMPONE NT RATIOS
EXPRESSED AS RATIOS OF 1939 VALUES, SELECTED YEARS
* Seenote to Chart 6 for identity of size classes.
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in thirty-three of forty instances recorded in the table. The ratio of
spending to assets, however, conformed with velocity in oniy thirteen
of the forty instances. In all classes this ratio was substantially
higher, and the ratio of assets to cash substantially lower, in 1947
than in 1939. The convergence of velocities described above thus
resulted largely from dissimilarities in behavior of spending-assets
ratios. These ratios approximately doubled over the 8-year period
for firms in the four largest classes, compared with a mere 8 per cent
rise in the smallest class.
Earlier we saw that differences in the importance of firms without
income help explain velocity differences between small and large
firms at any point in time. By the same token, the differential veloci-
ty movements among corporate size classes are attributable in part
to the diminished importance of deficit firms, as business conditions
improved after 1940. In 1939, assets of deficit firms made up 27.4
per cent of total non-financial corporate assets; for firms with less
than $50,000 assets, this figure exceeded 50 per cent. By 1943 the
business climate had changed dramatically. Assets of deficit firms
had fallen to 3.9 per cent of the total.
About a quarter of the velocity decline in the smallest class from
1939 to 1943 resulted directly from the increased profitability of
business. However, this effect was trivial for firms with more than
$100,000 assets and even for small firms after
In one respect that seems important for velocity analysis the war-
time business expansion differed sharply from typical peacetime ex-
pansions—credit markets remained easy. Short-term market yields
were already extremely low in 1939 and remained under 1 per cent
until 1947 or later. Bond yields eased somewhat during the war,
while rates on bank loans fluctuated within a narrow range around
their low prewar levels. The crude measures of interest costs for
profitable firms in Table 5 show some decline in average rates paid
35.Comparethe following velocity data for all firms and firms with net income:














1Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money 517
bymedium-sized and large firms between 1939 and 1943. From
1943 to 1946 the decline accelerated and was experienced by firms
of all sizes.
The fact that velocity failed to rise during the only recent business
expansion in which interest rates did not rise certainly suggests that
interest rates are a significant velocity determinant. However, it
seems unlikely that they alone could have produced the sharp veloci-
ty declines among profitable firms during the early war years. To
some extent these declines may have resulted from curtailment of
business spending because of emergency controls, but the substantial
rise in spending-asset ratios from 1941 to 1943 and 1943 to 1946
(see Table 10) does not square well with this interpretation. Fur-
thermore, if this was the reason for convergence of velocities during
1939—43, why did the convergence persist after controls had been
removed?
There is another possible explanation for the wartime behavior
of corporate velocity. Table 6 shows a substantial decline during
1939—43 in the importance of trade credit among small and medium-
sized firms with net income. Among larger firms the reverse was true.
Although various interpretations may be placed on these facts, the
most convincing isthat the war-induced prosperity produced a
marked improvement in business credit-worthiness, particularly
among smaller firms. Apparently, these firms were able to obtain
funds from less costly sources than formerly, and cash balances
were no longer a prohibitively expensive luxury.
CORPORATE VELOCITY SINCE 1947
By 1947 the four largest size classes had regained their 1941
velocity peaks, and the wartime episode was clearly over. Corporate
velocity continued upward during 1948—50, except for a decline in
1949. The rise in 1948 and the fall in 1949 appear to have been a
normal cyclical change that affected most firms in roughly the same
manner. The sharp jump in velocity in 1950 was another matter,
however: it was much sharper for small firms than for large firms,
and the largest size class did not even recover to its 1948 cyclical
peak. As a result, small-firm velocity rose more during 1948—50
than did that of large firms. Table 11 reveals that in all but the
largest class the velocity rise consisted almost entirely of a rise in
the ratio of total assets to cash rather than a rise in the ratio of
spending to total assets. The latter ratio actually declined during
this period of rapidly rising velocity in four of the five smallest size
classes.518 Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money
We can be fairly certain that these disparate velocity movements
in 1950 did not result from a greater reliance on substitute (i.e.,
non-cash) sources of liquidity by small firms: large and small firms
had approximately the same incentives to switch from cash into
government securities. In addition, the facts do not support the
money-substitute hypothesis. As Table 11 indicates, in all but the
three largest size classes the ratio of government securities to cash
was lower in 1950 than three years earlier. A substantial redistribu-
tion of corporate holdings of government securities took place in
this period, but in exactly the opposite direction to that implied by
the money-substitute hypothesis.
TABLE 11
PER CENT CHANGE IN VELOCITY, COMPONENT RATIOS, AND
RATIO OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES HOLDINGS TO CASH,





































































* Seenote to Chart 6 for identity of size classes.
A more plausible interpretation of the events of 1950 is that they
resulted from a differential tightening of credit among size classes.
Bank loans expanded with great rapidity in the latter half of 1950,
but the rate of expansion was considerably less for small than for
large firms, at least in manufacturing.36 Small firms, as we saw in
Table 11, were adding to their assets at a faster rate than to their
spending, but, to finance this buildup of assets, they were unable or
unwilling to go into debt to anywhere near the extent that large firms
were.37 Instead, they liquidated investments and trimmed cash re-
36. See Federal Trade Commission—Securities Exchange Commission, Quarterly Fi-
nancial Report of Manufacturing Corporations (2d quarter, 1951).
37. Thus firms in the smallest class increased accounts and notes payable by less
than 4 per cent in 1950, and in the next to smallest class by 11 per cent; the largestPostwar Rise in the Velocity of Money 519
quirernents in relation to other assets, with a consequent rise in
velocity.38
Another factor that probably affected corporate velocity in 1950
was the Korean War and the partial military mobilization that ac-
companied it. Wholesale prices climbed by about 15 per cent in the
last half of 1950, and expectations of inflation (or shortages) were
widely held. In this situation businessmen hurriedly built up inven-
tories. To some extent, cash balances were drawn down to finance
this buildup, and velocity rose. Inventories data clearly indicate
that small firms participated in this speculative surge to a much
greater extent than did large firms.39
Beginning in 1951, there were important new developments. Al-
though business conditions were good throughout most of the 195 1—
53 period, velocity fell moderately in the seven smallest size classes.
At the same time it rose sharply in the two largest classes and mod-
erately in the remaining class (class 8). A substantial convergence
of size-class velocities had set in again. In all classes, velocity fell
in 1954, a recession year, and rose in 1955, a year of vigorous re-
covery; and, in all classes, velocity was markedly higher by the ref-
erence-cycle peak year, 1957, than in 1953. However, the rates of
increase during 1954—57 were uneven, varying directly with cor-
porate size, and moderate additional convergence resulted.
Table 12 shows percentage changes in size-class velocities for the
entire period 1950—57. Large firms, which hold the lion's share of
corporate cash, were responsible for most of the velocity rise in
this period. Table 12 and Chart 7 analyze these velocity changes in
terms of their component ratios. As was true during 1948—50, veloci-
ty increases during 1951—57 consisted almost entirely of increases
in the ratio of assets to cash. The table also shows, however, that
these increases were not caused by shifts from cash to government
securities: the ratio of government securities holdings to cash fell
in all but the smallest class in this period; for non-financial cor-
porations as a whole this ratio fell from 0.69 in 1950 to 0.54 in
195
class (class 10) increased these items by 28 per cent, while class 8 increased them by
46 per cent. The same tendency was true of bonds and mortgages payable. Computed
from Statistics oJ (1949 and 1950),Part2, Table 6.
38. The four smallest size classes reduced their investments in 1950, while the others
(except class 9) increased them—sharply in the case of the largest class.
39. See Statistics of Income (1950), Part 2, Table 6.
40. On the other hand, the declines in this ratio were generally higher for small firms
than for large firms, indicating that corporate holdings of government securities were
redistributed from small to large firms—a change that is consistent with the observed
pattern of velocity movements.
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Corporate velocity movements during 1951—57 appear to have
resulted from at least three distinct factors. First, the tendency for
velocity to decline during 1951—53, except in the three largest size
classes, seems to represent a reversal of that part of the 1950 rise
that resulted from inventory speculation. We noted above that small
firms participated in the 1950 movement to a greater extent than did
large firms. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that small firms
were more greatly affected by the cessation of inflationary pressures
after early 1951. Second, there was a very modest redistribution of
TABLE 12
corporate holdings of government securities from small to large
firms. Thus the two largest classes held 67.8 per cent of the total in
1950, compared with 71.0 per cent in 1957. We have already seen,
however, that these holdings declined relative to cash, except in the
smallest class. At most, therefore, this change played a minor role
in the differential velocity movements during 1951—57; it does not
explain the generally rising trend of corporate velocity, nor was it
sufficiently powerful to account for much of the size-class differen-
tials that we have observed.
A third factor—the rising cost of holding money—seems a more
promising explanation of these corporate velocity changes. The fact
that interest rates rose during 195 1—57 needs no documentation.
The rise, particularly on short-term debt, wasevidentin all parts of
the credit market. The question remains: Were interest-rate changes
PER CENT CHANGE IN VELOCITY, COMPONENT RATIOS, AND RATIO OF
GOVERNMENT SECURITIES HOLDINGS TO CASH, NON-FINANCIAL





































































* Seenote to Chart 6 for identity of size classes.Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money 521
during 195 1—57 great enough to account for the observed velocity
changes, and, if so, how can they explain the size-class differentials?
There seems to be no way of providing a definitive answer. Plausi-
ble arguments were presented above in support of the hypothesis
that corporate velocity is a function of the cost of holding money;
this hypothesis helps explain both size-class differentials at any
CHART 7
PER CENT CHANGES IN VELOCITIES, ASSET-CASh RATIOS, AND SPENDING-ASSET RATIOS,
1950—57,NON-FINANCIALCoRPoRATIoNs, BY SIZE CLASSES*
Under$50,000:
Per cent change in
velocity
asset—cash ratio
t 50,000 to $100,000: spending-asset ratio
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point in time and differential movements over time. During 195 1—57
rates charged by banks on short-term loans to business rose from
aboutper cent to nearlyper cent in New York City. Com-
mercial paper rates rose comparably, and bond yields rose by more
than 50 per cent.4' These were substantial changes, in my judgment
fully adequate to account for velocity rises of the order actually
experienced.
The differential velocity movements in this period present a great-
er problem. They can be partly explained by the fact that bank
rates rose more on large loans than on small loans.42 However, the
size-class differentials depicted in Table 8 are much greater than
one would expect solely because of a diminished spread between
rates on large and small loans, particularly when it is recalled that
TABLE 13
PER CENT CHANGE IN CORPORATE VELOCITY,
BY MAJOR INDUSTRY DIVISION, 1950-57
Per Cent Change
Major Industry Division in Vclocity
Public utility 51.4
Agriculture, etc 33. 7





small-firm velocity rose little in this period, despite significant in-
creases in the cost of borrowed funds. It is possible that small firms,
with a higher cost of holding money, had reached a relatively in-
elastic part of the demand curve for money by 1951. On this in-
terpretation, even if the spread between the cost of holding money
for small and large firms had remained constant during 1951—57,
most of the actual convergence of size-class velocities might well
have taken place.
The preceding discussion accounts for the rise in corporate veloci-
ty during 195 1—57 and for the differential movements among size
classes. In addition, it has the great merit of being consistent with
differential movements among industries during this period. Table
13 gives percentage changes in velocity, 1950—57, by major industry
41. Federal Reserve Chart Book on Financial and Business Statistics, Historical Suppi.
(September, 1958), pp. 41—46.
42. "Bank Rates on Short-Term Business Loans," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Decem-
ber, 1958, p. 1421, and Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Monthly Review, June,
1958, p. 84.Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money 523
divisions. The rise was greatest in the public utility industry and
least in construction; we saw earlier (Table 7) that large firms are
most important in the former and least important in the latter. The
relationship between the size structure of industry and the degree of
velocity rise during 1951—57 is evident among the other industries
as well: both manufacturing and mining and quarrying are char-
acterized by relatively large firms, and both experienced sharp veloc-
ity increases; on the other hand, the trade and service industries,
where small units predominate, lagged far behind. The only excep-
tion is agriculture.
Various other explanations of the rise in corporate velocity after
1950 might be advanced, some of them with a measure of plausibil-
ity. For instance, one might argue that the mildness of the 1948—49
and 1953—54 recessions, coupled with the growing realization that
international tensions would not soon ease, caused a change in busi-
ness expectations about the economic future.43 Another possible
factor might be cost pressures, particularly labor costs. Neither of
these explanations, however, unlike the cost of holding money, can
account for differential movements among both size classes and in-
dustries. In the final analysis, therefore, we come back to the cost
of holding money as the critical variable determining corporate ve-
locity changes, as well as an important variable determining differ-
ences among size classes at any point in time.
CONSUMER VELOCITY
The contribution of the consumer sector to non-financial velocity
outweighs that of other sectors by a substantial margin (Table A-7).
It is regrettable, therefore, that there are no data on cash behavior
within consumer subgroups, such as exist• for the corporate sector.
This is all the more unfortunate because the consumer sector in-
cludes such diverse elements as households of greatly varying cir-
cumstances and personal trusts. Nevertheless, despite this lack, one
can make reasonable inferences about the determinants of postwar
consumer velocity behavior. As with corporations, the first problem is
to separate the transitory war-related movements from other veloc-
ity changes.
One of the more interesting facts shown in Chart 3 is the sizable
decline in consumer in 1940 and 1941, before the American
43. Milton Friedman placcs heavy emphasis on "the public's expectations about the
likely degree of economic stability." See his discussion along these lines in Towards
a Firmer Basis of Economic Policy: 41st Annual Report, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (New York, 1961), pp. 41—42.524 Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money
economy was placed under full-scale mobilization. Some ofthis de-
cline may have resulted from growing concern with the internation-
al situation as it affected the economic future. In addition, by 1941
the military buildup was causing many geographical and occupa-
tional shifts among the population—factors which may have in-
creased the demand for money. In my judgment, however, neither
of these explanations can account for declines of the size experi-
enced, particularly when it is realized that other developments, such
as the growing fear of inflation and prospective wartime shortages,
were tending to raise consumer velocity. It seems reasonable to con-
clude that another force—rapidly rising per •capita real income—
was pulling consumer velocity down in these years. Households ap-
parently wish to "consume" more of the services of cash as their
incomes rise; that is, their desired cash balances rise faster than ex-
penditures.44 It appears that this income effect was largely responsi-
ble for the declining trend of income velocity for a century or more
prior to World War II.
There is no reason to think that it has not continued to operate
since 1939. On the contrary, developments since then are consistent
with two important implications of the income effect. Other things
remaining the same, a rise in income will cause a decline in house-
hold velocity relative to non-household and aggregate velocity; in
addition, the household share of total cash will rise.45 During the
1939—56 period, consumer velocity fell relative to velocity in other
fund-flow sectors, and consumer cash holdings rose relative to total
cash.
If the above interpretation is accepted, it becomes clear at once
that much of the decline in consumer velocity during 1942—45 re-
sulted from the rapid increase in real income per capita rather than
from transitory factors associated with wartime economic policy. A
straight projection of the 1939—41 trend yields a consumer velocity
figure midway between the actual 1947 and 1948 values, but this
probably exaggerates the strength of the income effect and under-
plays the transitory war-induced changes. Whether or not these
transitory changes had worked themselves out by 1948 is question-
able, since consumer velocity continued to rise during the recession
44. The income effect is discussed further in Studies in the Quantity Theory of
Money, pp. 205 if. One can postulate conditions under which the income effect applies
to businesses and governments (see Friedman, The Demand for Money; Some Theoreti-
cal and Empirical Results). However, the effect seems most clearly relevant to house-
holds.
45. However, the household share could fall as income rises if a sufficiently exten-
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year 1949. However, by 1949 three years had passed since the armed
forces had been demobilized and price controls terminated; the pre-
liminary phase of postwar inflation had come to an end the year be-
fore, and non-price rationing was a thing of the past. It therefore
seems reasonable to conclude that the postwar adjustment period
was over for the consumer sector no later than 1949. Taking this as
the pivotal year, then, 1941—56 is subdivided into distinct periods—
1941—49 and 1950—56—subject to largely different velocity deter-
minants.
During the first of these periods, consumer velocity probably
would have fallen because of the rapid income rise, if for no other
reason. But there were other reasons for the decline, which, taken
together, were more important than the income effect. Three of them
were mentionedi46 (1) understatement of household expend-
itures because of unrecorded transactions and understated prices;
(2) an increased demand for money as people moved about the
country and faced uncertainties of various sorts; and (3) a reduc-
tion in opportunities to purchase consumer goods during the war. A
fourth reason must be added: the high marginal rates of taxation
during the war, which reduced the attractiveness of income-earning
assets.
The first two reasons are clear enough, though difficult to docu-
ment. Both probably imply an increased demand for currency rela-
tive to demand deposits, and the currency ratio did rise sharply dur-
ing the The third reason requires brief elaboration. There is
little question that wartime economic policy did effectively narrow
the range of alternatives available to households in disposing of in-
come. Gas rationing and the cessation of civilian automobile produc-
tion early in 1942 were probably most important in this respect, but
spending opportunities were also curtailed by many other changes di-
rectly related to the war—for example, the transfer of millions of
civilians into the armed forces. The main impact was on expendi-
tures for consumer durables, which fell in 1942 and 1943 and were
still well below the 1941 level at the end of the war. The released in-
come did not spill over into spending on non-durables: the ratio of
non-durables expenditures to personal disposable income fell sharp-
ly during this period. The ratio of total personal consumption ex-
46. See p. 513.
47. For a full discussion of factors responsible for the rise in currency during the
war see Philip D. Cagan, The Demand for Currency Relative to Totai Money Supply
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper No. 62 [New York, 1958]).526 Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money
penditures to disposable personal income fell from its customary
prewar peacetime level of about 0.9548to0.880 in 1941, 0.763 in
1942, 0.753 in 1943, 0.748 in 1944, and 0.809 in 1945.
Granted that wartime economic policy restricted consumption ex-
penditures, the question remains why households added to holdings
of cash rather than other liquid assets. The answer seems to be that
households allocated their released funds broadly among all types
of liquid assets. Life insurance reserves, commercial bank time de-
posits, savings and loan shares, postal savings—all these, as well as
cash and savings bonds, increased substantially during the war. All
that was necessary for declining velocity (as we have defined it)
was that some, even a minor, part of the newly acquired assets con-
sist of money. Such an outcome, of course, is to be expected on the
basis of the theory of optimum income and wealth allocation, given
the general stable pattern of asset yields. When these yields are
taken net of taxes, as they should be, it is all the more understand-
able that households were content to build up their cash balances.
Assuming that the rise in consumer velocity during 1946—49 was
mainly a reversal of the transitory wartime velocity movements, we
are left with the somewhat puzzling phenomenon of a persistent rise
in consumer velocity after 1949. Other things being equal, the in-
come effect should have caused consumer velocity to fall in this pe-
riod, since income per capita rose. Obviously, however, other things
were not equal. The outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, led
to increased purchases of consumer durables, because of anticipated
price rises and shortages; consumer velocity therefore rose. Even
more enduring forces were pushing consumer velocity upward after
1950: interest rates were rising, especially yields. on savings and loan
shares and other liquid assets; consumer credit was becoming in-
creasingly available (after Regulation W lapsed early in 1952); and
the marginal utility of precautionary balances had decreased. This
last factor was a result of numerous social changes during the preced-
ing decade, as well as the unexpected mildness of the 1948—49 reces-
sion,49 and the growing realization after 1950 that the cold war
would impart a buoyancy to the American economy for many years
to come. It is also possible that consumer demand for money fell
because households in this period came increasingly to believe in the
inevitability of inflation. Let us examine these forces more closely.
The limited nature of the impact of the Korean War on consumer
48. It was 0.95 in 1929, 0.96 in 1939, and 0.945 in 1940.
49. See Milton Friedman in Towards a Firmer Basis of Economic Policy.Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money 527
velocity is indicated by the behavior of consumption expenditures
during 1950 and 1951. Purchases of consumer durables, seasonally
adjusted, fell in the final quarter of 1950, after a sharp third-quar-
ter increase. Although they increased again in the first quarter of
1951, in the second quarter of that year they were barely above the
1950 second-quarter figure; in the third and fourth quarters of 1951
these purchases were well below figures of a year earlier. Similarly,
the ratio of total consumption expenditures to disposable income,
after rising sharply in the first three quarters of 1950, fell even more
sharply in the final quarter of the year. The ratio rose again in the
first quarter of 1951 but once more reverted to low levels for the
remainder of the year. In part these developments may be attributed
to Regulation W, which was re-established on September 18, 1950,
and remained in effect until May 7, 1952. In any case, it does not
seem reasonable to attribute a significant part of the rise in con-
sumer velocity after 1950 to the direct influence of the Korean War.
Whether or not inflationary expectations were responsible for an
important part of the 1951—56 rise in consumer velocity is more
difficult to determine. Inflation was inconsequential during most of
the period: wholesale prices were either stable or declining from
early 1951 to mid-1955, and the BLS Consumer Price Index changed
little from mid-1952 to early 1956. Nevertheless, the mildness of
the 1948—49 recession, together with the continuation of the cold
war, apparently convinced many that deflation could not be ex-
pected for a long time to come and that long-run price-level move-
ments were likely to be upward. The mild 1953—54 recession pro-
vided additional support for this view. It is noteworthy that yields
on common stocks fell sharply, while bond yields edged upward,
throughout the period, possibly indicating a growing concern about
the future value of money. At the same time, however, it must be
noted that household holdings of equities and tangible assets, which
appreciate during inflation, grew no faster than holdings of fixed
claims in this period.50 Everything considered, inflationary expec-
tations, while perhaps a contributing factor, do not seem to have
been strong enough to account for a major part of the observed rise
in consumer velocity during 195 1—5 6.
Higher interest rates also may have been partly responsible for
the rise in consumer velocity after 1950, but it is not at all clear
which interest rates are most relevant to the consumer sector. The
50.Basedon preliminary estimates by Raymond W. Goldsmith in a manuscript in
preparation for the National Bureau of Economic Research series on postwar capital
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demand for money of high-income households and personal trusts
may well be sensitive to yields on long-term tax-exempt securities
and Treasury bills; that of high- and middle-income households, to
yields on liquid fixed claims; and that of middle- and low-income
households, to costs of consumer and mortgage credit. I know of no
way to estimate the relative importance of changes in various kinds
of interest rates. All interest rates increased during 1951—56, with
the possible exception ofrates on consumer instalment loans.
Though the latter rates may not have risen, the volume of house-
hold debt increased enormously in these years, and the cost of credit
became a determinant of the demand for money for a larger pro-
portion of households. The fact that consumer velocity rose even in
1954 suggests that, for this sector, the volume of debt outstanding
and the level of yields on fixed claims, both of which rose in that
year, are more important velocity determinants than market rates
of interest, which fell.
Finally, numerous other social changes that impinge on consumer
velocity were taking place at accelerated rates throughout the post-
war period. I have mentioned the reduced importance of precaution-
ary balances to households. In part this reflects a reduction in the
level of uncertainty (because of the diminishing volatility ofper-
sonal incomes, for example) and in part the development of non-
cash buffers against uncertainty. Among the latter changes are the
rise of medical and unemployment insurance and, more significant-
ly, the increased availability of credit to households. Credit became
more available because of federal government legislation in the resi-
dential mortgage field, the growth of credit life insurance, and the
increased use of credit cards, to mention only a few of the changes
in this area. It is also possible that the great expansion of house-
hold debt, most of it instalment debt, decreased the demand for
money, for transactions purposes as well as for precautionary pur-
poses, by shortening intervals between receipts and payments for
households. Of course, all the velocity determinants mentioned in
this paragraph were operating before 195 1—56, the period we have
been examining, and in some cases they were operating even before
World War II. It is not obvious that they suddenly increased in
importance after 1950.
We are left in the unsatisfactory predicament of being unable to
choose among several plausible alternatives. One thing is clear, how-
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that appear to be relevant to the household demand for money were
operating to increase consumer velocity after 1950. It is therefore
not surprising that consumer velocity did rise during 1951—56, even
though we cannot determine precisely why.
POSTWAR VELOCITY CHANGES IN OTHER SECTORS
The two sectors already analyzed have dominated postwar veloc-
ity movements, since they hold nearly two-thirds of the total money
stock. Nevertheless, three other sectors, smaller in terms of money
holdings, also merit brief attention.
The most important of the three is the non-corporate sector,
which in recent years has held about one-sixth of all money. We saw
in Chart 3 that non-corporate velocity closely resembled consumer
velocity in its movements throughout 1939—56 and particularly after
1945. This is not surprising in view of the general lack of rigorous
accounting separation between household and business or farm
transactions and cash balances, together with the relatively simple
decision-making structure within most farms and unincorporated
epterprises. The considerably higher level of non-corporate velocity
presumably results from the importance of high-velocity trading
firms in this sector.51
Next in importance is the state and local sector. It seems
that higher short-term interest rates have had an impact
on state and local velocity. Like their business counterparts, finan-
cial officers of these governments have discovered that the Treasury
bill market affords opportunities for using temporary cash accumu-
lations to supplement income. Higher bond yields undoubtedly have
also had some effect on state and local velocity by causing officials
to trim cash balances to the minimum in order to reduce high-cost
borrowing.
Finally, there is the federal government sector, whose velocity has
been influenced in an upward direction by the desire to avoid debt
increases—not so much to minimize interest costs but rather as a
basic article of political faith. The Eisenhower Administration, in
particular, regarded any increase in the national debt as a major
evil and recognized that the reduction in cash balances was a sub-
stitute for borrowing.
51. The 1957 income of unincorporated enterprises was of which enter-
prises in wholesale and retail trade accounted for or more than one-
fourth (U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Income and Output [Washington, 19581,
Table VI-4).